The SRTR data do not directly identify whether a transplant candidate is multilisted, so we create a multilisting identifier based on a unique patient identification variable. If a patient has never had a transplant, all of their registrations for that given organ are categorized as a single spell. We code all registrations as part of a multiple listing or not. We also code the chronological order of the multilisting registrations within spells.
we create a multilisting identifier based on a unique patient identification variable. For each patient, we identify all registrations that belong to the same spell for a single-organ transplant by working backwards from the end of a listing spell. A spell ends when the individual receives a transplant, leaves the waitlist when there are no open registrations, dies without receiving a transplant, or is still on a waitlist when the data were extracted in 2014.
For each individual, all registrations in which the listing date is the same date or earlier than the first observed transplant or death are coded as part of the individual's first spell. A subsequent spell begins when a registration occurs following the end of a previous spell from transplant and ends when we observe a transplant or death. All registrations that begin after the date of the 2 nd spell and end before or at the same time as the 2 nd spell are coded in the 2 nd spell and so on. Registrations that occur after the most recent transplant are counted as the final spell.
If a patient has never had a transplant, all of their registrations for that given organ are categorized as a single spell. We code all registrations as part of a multiple listing or not. We also code the chronological order of the multilisting registrations within spells.
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3) Sample means for relevant dependent variables are listed in brackets . In cases in which a county is split between two DSAs, we use a variable in the countylevel data which lists the share of deaths in a county that were handled by a specific OPO. Only 2 percent of the counties are split between two DSAs, and only 1.4 percent of the counties are split between two DSAs for more than one year. When the county is split in only one year, it is because the DSA's boundaries were changing in that year (see below), which occurs infrequently. To account for shifts in DSA boundaries, we assign, for all years, the entire county to the DSA where the larger share of the county referrals was made in 2013. We gratefully thank Bryn Thompson at SRTR for helping us resolve these issues.
A second issue for assigning the counties to DSAs is that the DSAs changed over time and, in some cases, the names of the OPOs that administer the DSAs changed over time.
Therefore, in our individual-level data, we have transplant candidates listed in OPOs/DSAs that no longer exist and are not available in the current mapping between counties and DSAs. Mark
Paster at the Association of Organ Procurement Organization and Chas MacKenzie at the Life Choice Donor Services provided valuable information on the history of a Wisconsin OPO name change and a Connecticut name discrepancy in our data. A more substantive issue is that many of the original DSAs eventually merged into the current set of DSAs. That is, 30 OPOs/DSAs in the SRTR dataset were in existence at one point but no longer exist. 13 of those were only in existence between 1987 and 1988. We do not have data on which counties were in the DSAs in the early years; we only know that the DSAs existed. Peggye Wilkerson of CMS suggested that the county-DSA concordance from those years is not readily available. The most straightforward solution, we believe, is to assume that the current county to DSA designation was always in place. It seems unlikely that this would substantively affect our results since we are simply treating two DSAs as if they were always one and the DSAs are likely to be affected by the same 2) Each figure plots event-study estimates as described in specification (2) in the text. 2) Each figure plots event-study estimates as described in specification (2) in the text. Costs might also include insurance costs that differ depending on where transplant centers are located, information costs, health conditions that determine where a person is on a waiting list in a DSA, and the availability of outside options such as living donors. Our comparative statics remain unchanged if we include fixed listing costs in the model in order capture these differences.
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There are many dimensions of marginal candidates because once a candidate joins, her place on the list is not welldefined. There is not an actual waiting list, but rather a pool of candidates generated each time a deceased organ becomes available. Depending on health status, transplant compatibility measures, and, in some cases, waiting time a candidate accrued and transferred from another list, a person who is a recent addition on the waitlist may be higher on the list generated for a particular organ than those who registered earlier.
located between and sign up for both waitlists. These multilisting candidates leave both waitlists when they receive a transplant.
The benefit from signing up on a given list depends on the list's expected waiting time as well as expected organ quality. 3 We assume that, all else equal, the expected waiting time increases with the number of candidates on the list, and it decreases with the size of the overlap.
A larger overlap decreases waiting time because, for a given number of candidates on a list, the "queue" moves more quickly when there are more candidates that are also signed up on another list -some of those candidates ultimately receive an organ via the other list, thereby exiting both.
We impose that the "overlap effect" is smaller than the direct effect of a change in on wait time; for example, if rises so that there are more candidates on list X but also more candidates on both lists, expected waiting time in X will increase. We view this condition as quite likely to hold in practice.
Expected waiting time is also decreasing in market "thickness" , the supply of organs in a given DSA. For simplicity, and because our primary interest lies in characterizing comparative statics when changes exogenously, we only allow thickness to vary in DSA X. Thus, expected waiting time in X is , , , with first derivatives given by 0, 0, and 0, respectively. Note that 0 because of the "overlap effect" -when increases, so that the number of candidates registered in Y declines, expected waiting times in X increase because 3 Lindsay and Feigenbaum (1984) propose a market-clearing model for waiting lists for medical procedures that also focuses on the role of expected waiting time in the decision to join a list. Their model describes a context involving a single market (the British National Health Service), rather than the multiple markets that characterize the organ allocation system in the U.S. First, we demonstrate that the two curves defined by (D1) and (D2) are downwardsloping in , space. We apply the Implicit Function Theorem to derive the slope of equation (D1):
where , the derivative of with respect to expected waiting time in market X, is negative.
Both and are positive, implying that both the numerator and denominator of (D1) are negative.
Applying the same logic to equation (D2) Similarly, implies 2 1 . Thus, the inequality in (D5) holds, implying that the equilibrium is unique.
Q.E.D.
The assumptions that and are arguably innocuous. Consider the first assumption, . Intuitively, this means that the effect on expected waiting time in market X of an increase in the number of candidates on market X's waitlist is larger than the effect of an identically-sized decrease in the number of candidates on market Y's waitlist, i.e., an increase in . The first effect operates directly -more candidates in DSA X lead to longer waiting times -while the second effect operates only indirectly through the overlap effectholding constant the number of candidates in X, fewer candidates on Y's waitlist reduces overlap, thereby increasing expected waiting time in X. The intuition behind the condition that is similar. As a result, we view these two conditions as very likely to hold in reality.
Given uniqueness, we can characterize how shocks to the supply of organs in market X affect candidate behavior in both markets. Figure D2 shows the functions defined by (D1) and (D2) in , space. Note that both functions are strictly downward-sloping (this is demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1). Suppose t increases from, say, t0 to t1. This positive supply shock increases for two reasons: it decreases expected waiting time and it increases expected organ quality. As increases, more candidates sign up on waitlist X; for a given , must increase to restore equality in (D1). These marginal candidates live farther from point 0 and therefore have higher transportation costs than those who listed in X before the shock. Thus, the curve shifts to the right, as indicated by the dashed downward-sloping line in the figure.
As a result, increases and falls, implying that both waitlists get longer and the overlap increases (recall that a reduction in corresponds to more candidates registered in Y). To see why falls, note that the increase in -due to the direct effect of the shock -decreases This simple model predicts unambiguously that, following a positive supply shock in DSA X, more candidates join the waitlist in X (and in Y). In addition, the marginal joiners have higher travel costs than those who would join in the absence of the shock -they are disproportionately likely to be those who do not live within the DSA's coverage area. Expected organ quality also increases in the DSA that received the shock. Finally, the effect on expected waiting time is ambiguous because more candidates register for waitlists (in all markets). 2) Each figure plots event-study estimates as described in specification (2) in the text. 
